UPJA Virtual Conference for Undergraduate Philosophy
3rd & 4th December, 2022

Day 1: Saturday December 3rd, 01:50 PM – 04:30 PM AEDT (UTC+11)

[01:50] Introduction and Welcome from the Editorial Team
James Cafferky, Anna Day, Eloise Hickey, and Mark Rothery

Student Presentations

[02:00] *Towards a Relational Model of Just Epistemic Training in Childhood*
Emily Baird, The University of Sydney

[02:30] *The Death of the Public? How the Internet Creates a Widespread Cooperation Problem, and Why We Should Care*
Rashna Farrukh, Australian National University

Saturday Keynote Address

[03:00] *Practical Knowledge and Shared Agency*
Glenda Satne, University of Wollongong

Student Presentation

[04:00] *Social isolation and exclusion in a technologically mediated world – an argument against the neutrality thesis and a call for a conscious digital interaction*
Inger Cini, University of Malta

Day 2: Sunday December 4th, 10:20 AM – 01:00 PM AEDT (UTC+11)

[10:20] Welcome and Q&A from the Editorial Team
James Cafferky, Anna Day, Eloise Hickey, and Mark Rothery

Student Presentations

[10:30] *Against Creationism in Fiction: How (Not) to Create nor Destroy Sherlock Holmes*
Kam-Ho Chan, Hong Kong Baptist University

Sunday Keynote Address

[11:00] *A Buddhist Challenge to Formal Logic*
Koji Tanaka, Australian National University

Student Presentations

[12:00] *Haslanger's Method for (Un)Warranted Ideology Critique*
Hamish Scott-Stevenson, University of Melbourne

[12:30] *Colyvan's Dilemma: Colyvan's Dilemma: Inconsistency, Theoretic Virtues, and Scientific Practice*
Johnny Kennedy, The University of Sydney

Keynote Presenter Abstracts and Bios

[Saturday Keynote] Glenda Satne, University of Wollongong
Saturday December 3rd, 03:00 PM – 04:00 PM AEDT (UTC+11)

"Practical Knowledge and Shared Agency"

For Anscombe a solitary activity is intentional if the agent has self-knowledge of what she is doing. Analogously one might think that to partake in shared intentional activities is for the agents involved to have plural or collective self-knowledge of what they are doing together. I call this 'the Plural Practical Knowledge Thesis' (PPK). While some authors have advanced related theses about the nature of the knowledge involved in shared practical activities (see Laurence 2011, Schmid 2016, Rödl 2015, 2018) this alternative remains relatively underexplored in the current literature. The paper offers an account of plural practical knowledge based on the idea that shared activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures. It then proposes a paradigmatic methodology that generalizes this account to understand what different cases of collective intentional action have in common. Finally, the paper exposes the reasons why it should be preferred to other related strategies.

Glenda Satne is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at UOW who specialises in Philosophy of Mind and Social Ontology. Her research focuses on E-approaches to the Mind and Sociality. Her areas of interest include: collective intentionality, joint action, social cognition, the second-person, normativity and the role played by culture in human evolution. She has written on many topics connected to these including: music improvisation, social learning, social bias, evolution and cooperation, social norms, and social attention. She is also interested in Metaphilosophy and Naturalism, and usually writes on those topics too. She has written a book on Wittgenstein and she is currently writing one on social normativity. She is a member of the steering committee of ISOS (International Social Ontology Society) and a member of the AAP committee for the Status of Women in the Philosophy Profession.

[Sunday Keynote] Koji Tanaka, Australian National University
Sunday December 4th, 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM AEDT (UTC+11)

"A Buddhist Challenge to Formal Logic"

We are familiar with asking for reasons. When we make a claim or present an idea, our interlocutor often asks why a claim is correct or why we think we have the right idea. When we are asked to provide reasons for our claims or ideas, we offer reasons to show we know what we are talking about. Some of the reasons we offer may not satisfy our interlocutor, while others do. Logic is about the reasons that make our claims or ideas *true*. It is concerned with the reasons that support the truth of the claim or idea that we want our interlocutor to accept. In particular, logic is concerned with the relation that preserves truth between the reason and the claim. This truth-preserving relation is usually understood to be *formal*. However, this formal conception of logic can be challenged from a Buddhist perspective. In this talk, I will present a Buddhist conception of logic and use this to show how to use Buddhist material to challenge the formal conception of logic.

Koji Tanaka is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Science, at the Australian National University. His main research areas are logic, philosophy and history of logic, philosophy of language and Buddhist philosophy. His current project aims to advance a new theory about the nature of logic and modality which draws on Buddhist philosophical material.

The UPJA Virtual Conference for Undergraduate Philosophy is brought to you by the Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia. Our current UPJA Editorial team is James Cafferky, Anna Day, Eloise Hickey, and Mark Rothery. You can find out more about the Journal's work and sign up for our mailing list at upja.online.