

# *Beyond Production and Manifestation: Re-evaluating Uddyotakara's Logical Moves Against Sāṃkhya in Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika 458.5–459.2*

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## **Abstract**

In this paper, I revisit a segment of the Indian philosophical debate between *asatkāryavādins* (those who hold that effects are not existent within their causes, pre-causation, and must be produced anew) and *satkāryavādins* (those who hold that effects are existent within their causes, pre-causation, and cannot be produced anew) featuring Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya in Nyāyasūtra 4.1.49, Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya 242.16, and Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika 458.5–459.2. I analyze the sub-debate—as formulated by the attributed author of Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika, Uddyotakara—wherein Sāṃkhya argues that during causation, pre-existent effects are merely manifested and are not new creations, while Uddyotakara, on Nyāya's behalf, shows Sāṃkhya's position to be contradictory, thus establishing Nyāya's position that the effect is not pre-existent and hence, must be a new creation. I show that the contradiction identified by Uddyotakara is a consequence of an equivocation found in his reconstruction of Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavādin* position and does not follow from his arguments in [NV 458.5–459.2]. I further argue that if the equivocation is identified, then this segment of the *asatkāryavādin* versus *satkāryavādin* debate that seems to be a sub-debate between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya on the nature of the effect collapses into a fundamental disagreement about ontological commitments, the incompatibility of which serves as possible grounds for a meta-ontological debate.

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## § 1. The Debate

If a mango seed turns into a mango plant, does that seed contain that plant before turning into that plant? Does the given mango seed and the mango plant (that the given seed turns into) co-exist before this seed turns into this plant? Analysing the philosophical disagreement on how to answer the first type of question is at the heart of this paper. Put simply, my project is to show that how one answers the first type of question is linked to how one answers the second type of question. An affirmative answer to the first type of question, as for Sāṃkhya, presupposes the commitment that such co-existence is the case. Alternatively, as for Nyāya, the commitment that such co-existence is not the case entails a negative answer to the first type of question. I demonstrate that by making said commitments explicit, the charge of contradictoriness against Sāṃkhya's affirmative answer—by the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara in Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika 458.5–459.2—cannot be sustained. The form of the first question can be made explicit as follows: Given two distinguishable entities/events X and Y, wherein we know that X can and does turn into Y (but not vice versa), is it the case that Y is contained within X, prior to X turning into Y—on any understanding of the concepts: 'distinguishable' and 'containment'? For those who hold that there are entities/events such that X turns into Y, this question can be restated thus:

Q1: If the cause brings about the effect, then is the effect contained within the cause, in some form, prior to that effect being brought about by that cause?<sup>2</sup>

Satkāryavādins say, "Yes."; Asatkāryavādins say, "No." Thenceforth, a debate ensues. satkāryavādins—specifically, philosophers from the Indian philosophical school Sāṃkhya, the Sāṃkhyas<sup>3</sup>—must clarify in what form the effect is contained within the cause. For example, they must account for how the mango plant is contained within the mango seed from which it arises. On the other hand, asatkāryavādins—specifically, philosophers from the Indian philosophical school Nyāya, the Naiyāyikas—must give a robust account of causal regularity in the absence of such containment.<sup>4</sup> For example, they must account for why a specific mango seed turns, exclusively, into a specific mango plant and not into an apple tree,

<sup>2</sup> What I mean by temporal priority and other related notions shall be designated in §3.

<sup>3</sup> This is a historical and grammatical peculiarity wherein the word 'Sāṃkhya' can refer to both a school of Indian philosophy and a (singular) follower of that school. There is an old term 'Sāṃkhist' as found in Mukerji, J. N. (1932) *Sāṃkhya or The Theory of Reality: A Critical and Constructive Study of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārika*, Sreekrishna Printing Works, 2; and Bhattacharyya, Kalidas (1981) 'Studies in Comparative Indian Philosophy.' *Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Institute of Culture* 32(1), 15., which is not in popular use anymore. Throughout this paper, the sentence in which this word occurs should serve as the grammatical context for determining what "Sāṃkhya" refers to—the follower or the philosophical school—within that sentence. Thereby I follow Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips in the usage of 'Sāṃkhya', as can be seen here: Dasti, Matthew, and Stephen Phillips (2017) *The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries*. Hackett Publishing, 112–13.

<sup>4</sup> By Causal Regularity, I have in mind the following articulation of the Regularity View of Causation (RVC): "iii. all events of type C (i.e. events that are like c) are regularly followed by (or are constantly conjoined with) events of type E (i.e. events like e)." as it occurs here: Psillos, Stathis, and Helen Beebe, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies eds. (2012) 'Regularity Theories', *The Oxford Handbook of Causation*, Oxford Academic, 131.

grapevine, raspberry bush, etc.<sup>5</sup> These clarifications occur throughout various philosophical texts, one of which is the *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* by Naiyāyika Uddyotakara. This paper focuses on examining the logical structure of one such sub-debate between a Naiyāyika-siddhāntin and a Sāṃkhya-pūrvapakṣin that is found in [NS 4.1.49], [NB 242.16], and [NV 458.5–459.2]<sup>6</sup> The following question spearheads this sub-debate:

Q2: Is the effect something *new* that comes about?

For the *satkāryavādin*s, the cause contains the effect already. Therefore, Sāṃkhya's answer is "No." For the *asatkāryavādin*s, the cause does not contain the effect. Therefore, Nyāya's answer is "Yes."<sup>7</sup> Uddyotakara speaks on behalf of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while the Sāṃkhya opponent remains unidentified. However, given that Uddyotakara's is a Nyāya commentative philosophical text, he reconstructs the position of a Sāṃkhya opponent, and the debate ends with Uddyotakara claiming that a contradiction arises from the Sāṃkhya position. Thus, the debate resolves in favour of Nyāya. This allows Uddyotakara to establish the correctness and the philosophical merit of the *asatkāryavādin* answers to Q<sub>1</sub> and Q<sub>2</sub> over the *satkāryavādin* answers.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The adjective 'specific' may seem redundant, but it designates token-to-token or type-to-type causation, as opposed to type-to-token or token-to-type causation. Which is to say that the *asatkāryavādin* must also explain *how* a mango seed on one side of my garden bed in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India is as incapable of turning into the *type* of mango sapling that is found in Los Michos, Sinaloa, Mexico—as it is incapable of turning into the *token* of mango sapling that could grow out from a mango seed planted on *another* side of the same garden bed.

<sup>6</sup> Two important points of contextual clarification:

(i) Within a Nyāya-typical philosophical debate (*vāda*), the *siddhāntin* is one who purports the thesis (*siddhānta*) and the *pūrvapakṣin* is one who purports the counter-thesis (*pūrvapakṣa*). For contemporary debating-sensibilities, given a debate topic of the form: "Is X the case?" or "Should Y be the case?"—the *siddhāntin* would say "Yes; X is the case." or "Yes; Y should be the case.", while the *pūrvapakṣin* would say "No; X is not the case." or "No; Y should not be the case." and the debate would ensue accordingly. For more on Nyāya notion of debate see Dasti and Phillips, 175–200. For more on *vāda* see footnote 84.

(ii) My teachers of Indian Philosophy and the Sanskrit Language—namely Professors Alex Watson, Dmitry Shevchenko, Nirajan Kafle, Arindam Chakrabarti, and Raja Rosenhagen at Ashoka University (India)—employ a nomenclatural schema, which will be employed by me in this paper. I will be translating the Sanskrit words "-vāda" and "-vādin" as the English suffixes "-ism" and "-ist" respectively. For example, "sat-kārya-vāda" is translated, literally, as Existent-Effect-*ism*. Similarly, "sat-kārya-vādin" which is the Sanskrit word used to identify a (singular) propagator and/or defender of any of the philosophical positions within *satkāryavāda*—is translated as Existent-Effect-*ist*. I restrict these translations to the footnotes as they won't be relevant to understanding the philosophical positions and the discussion about them that will occur within this paper. That being said, I provide these translations nonetheless for they may assist the reader in keeping a track of what position connects with which discussion where—if the reader is so inclined to keep a track of debates in Indian Philosophy.

<sup>7</sup> The reader may note how their answers to Q<sub>2</sub> relate to those to Q<sub>1</sub>.

<sup>8</sup> Uddyotakara concludes, as we shall see towards the end of that §3.2, since the Sāṃkhya attempt to contain the effect within the cause leads to a contradiction, it must be the case that, as the Nyāya purports, the cause does not contain the effect. Moreover, since the cause does not contain the effect, when the cause does bring about the effect, the effect must be something *new* that comes about.

In this paper, I show that the precious contradiction of Uddyotakara is a consequence of an equivocation found in his reconstruction of Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavādin* position and does not follow from his arguments in [NV 458.5–459.2]. I further argue that if the equivocation is identified, then this segment of the *asatkāryavādin* versus *satkāryavādin* debate that seems to be a sub-debate between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya on the nature of the effect collapses into a fundamental disagreement about ontological commitments.<sup>9</sup> §2 focuses on the Nyāya-Sāṃkhya disagreement on causation leading up to Uddyotakara. §2.1 features some considerations, and §2.2 elaborates upon the causal disagreement utilising said considerations. §3 focuses on extracting Uddyotakara's arguments, demonstrating their failure to establish a contradiction within the Sāṃkhya causal position and identifying reasons thereof. §3.1 models Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's causal views in light of §1–2, §3.2 features Uddyotakara's three major arguments employing said models, §3.3 postulates Sāṃkhya's ontological commitments and captures why said arguments fail, and §3.4 identifies the reason for Uddyotakara's equivocal reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya position that leads to said failure by postulating Nyāya's ontological commitments. In §4, I conclude by demonstrating the incompatibility of Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's ontological commitments as possible grounds for a meta-ontological debate, notwithstanding the faults in [NV 458.5–459.2].

## § 2. A New Introduction to Old Things<sup>10</sup>

In this section, I propose four cases, and at the end of each case, I pose the following question:

Q<sub>3</sub>: Have we now considered one thing or two things?<sup>11</sup>

Reviewing the four cases and our answer to each instance of Q<sub>3</sub>, we shall articulate nuances of the Nyāya (qua *asatkāryavādin*) versus Sāṃkhya (qua *satkāryavādin*) debate—culminating into Uddyotakara's qualms with Sāṃkhya's position.

<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that this is not merely a paper on causation but a paper that analyses the logical robustness of a debate that has been dubbed as a debate on causation and the conclusion that this debate tries to establish. Therefore, I will not be defending the Nyāya position on causation against that of Sāṃkhya or vice versa. My modest project is to show that Uddyotakara's argumentative manoeuvres in [NV 458.5 – 459.2] fail and are unable to establish the refutation of the Sāṃkhya causal view in the way he takes them to.

<sup>10</sup> The style of suppositional reasoning (i.e. consideration-based reasoning) employed in this section is inspired by the what the Naiyāyikas called *tarka*. It was the primary tool employed in philosophical reasoning by all schools of Indian Philosophy, even by the Cārvākas (the Hedonist School) and skeptics like Sañjaya Belatṭhiputta and Śrīharṣa. For more on *tarka* the reader may consult Phillips, Stephen (2014) *Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School*, Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 30–33.

<sup>11</sup> Within §1, I do not specify what I mean by 'thing'. However, I use this word in specific ways in the hopes of disambiguating my usage to designate a general usage of the term. This is intentional on my part to fit the colloquio-pragmatic ends of suppositional reasoning (*tarka*, see footnote 10). Within §2, as will be noted, I discharge the usage of 'thing' and instead use the ontologically restricted 'entity/event'—as we model the causal views of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya in greater detail.

## § 2.1 Four Cases, Four Considerations

Case A: Consider a thing. It is raining while I am writing this, and there is cereal kept across the mess hall, where I am seated, so I suggest we consider a bowl of milk. Then, let us again consider something. Say, we consider a numerically identical bowl of milk, containing numerically identical milk occupying the same space at the same time as the previously considered bowl of milk.

Have we now considered one thing or two things? While we have made two considerations, I'd say they have been about the one and the same (qua numerically identical) thing.

Case B: Consider something. Say, a bowl of milk. Then, consider something *else*. Say, a bowl of yoghurt.

Have we now considered one thing or two things? For our purposes, no bowl of milk is also, simultaneously, a bowl of yoghurt, and no bowl of yoghurt is also, simultaneously, a bowl of milk.<sup>12</sup> In other words, a bowl of yoghurt is sufficiently *distinct* from a bowl of milk for them not to be one and the same thing, whatever may be the points of difference (or similarity).<sup>13</sup> If this much is uncontroversially true, then we have now considered *two* things: a bowl of milk and a bowl of yoghurt. With two things considered, we may now consider how they may be related to each other.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Of course, this assumes that the bowl of milk contains no traces of yoghurt and vice versa. This assumption—about the distinction between a bowl of milk and a bowl of yoghurt—shall sustain throughout this paper, shall sustain throughout the paper unless specified otherwise. Additionally, guided by this notion of simultaneity and numerical distinction, Nyāya's causal model [3.1.N] and Sāṃkhya's causal model [3.1.S] include [3.1.N.3] and [3.1.S.3], respectively.

<sup>13</sup> This is à la Leibniz's Indiscernability of Identicals. See Section 1 of Forrest, Peter, and Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, eds. (2010) 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. This is the notion of discernability I have in mind when I mention two entities/events being distinguishable towards the beginning of §1.

<sup>14</sup> In my understanding, such considerations were possible even when we had just one thing at hand. In fact, earlier, we did engage in evaluating whether the relation of identity holds between the object of our first consideration and that of our second consideration. Upon granting that said relation holds, we were able to arrive at the conclusion that the considerations thus far have been about not two but one thing. The reader may know that *numerical identity*, stipulated thus, is an example of a binary relation which is *reflexive* i.e. a relation which a thing (here, a bowl of curd) stands in with itself (i.e. a bowl of curd is identical to itself). The relation which will be relevant to us in this paper will be the causal relation (between the cause and effect) which, for our purposes, will remain asymmetric and hence, irreflexive. Therefore, I chose to invoke the talk of relations after the consideration of (at least) two things. For more on relations, the reader may want to peruse Section 1 of MacBride, Fraser, and Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, eds. (2016) 'Relations', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2025 Edition). An example of how I shall be invoking relations in this paper: One may ask questions of the form: "Is the bowl of milk placed to the left of the bowl of yoghurt?" or "Was the bowl of milk filled before the bowl of yoghurt was filled?" The former seems to be a question about a spatial relation. This relation can be stated as: X is placed to the left of Y. The latter seems to be a question about a temporal relation that can be stated as: X was filled before Y was filled. Say, the answer to both of these questions is: "Yes." If such is granted, then it will be the case that the bowl of milk is *indeed* placed to the left of the bowl of yoghurt and the bowl of milk was *indeed* filled before the bowl of yoghurt was filled. Moreover, two inferences will follow in each case. In the former case, it

Case C: Consider that a bowl of milk was *completely emptied* and then that *same* bowl was *filled* with yoghurt.

Have we now considered one thing or two things? In my understanding, we are still considering *two* things, but not in the way that we did earlier. Case B featured two physically distinct bowls, while Case C features just one bowl. Then, in what way may we still be considering two things? This is where we must determine how a bowl of milk is related to a bowl of yoghurt in Case C and how this is different from how they are related in Case B.<sup>15</sup> This difference can be explicitly stated as follows:

In Case B, we considered *two* spatially and physically distinct bowls, each simultaneously containing a spatially and physically distinct type of colloidal mixture.<sup>16</sup> In Case C, we considered *one* spatially and physically self-identical bowl, which contained one type of colloidal mixture for some time, and then contained another type of colloidal mixture after that time—first milk, then yoghurt. Unlike Case B, in Case C, the colloidal mixtures (that is, the contents of the bowl) are

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would follow that the bowl of yoghurt is placed to the *right* of the bowl of milk (i.e. *not* to the left of it) and that the bowl of milk is not placed to the *left* of *itself*. In the latter case, it would follow that the bowl of yoghurt was filled *after* the bowl of milk was filled (i.e. *not* filled before it) and that the bowl of milk was not filled *before itself*. This is so because the two relations described above are examples of asymmetric relations wherein if *X* stands in a given relation to *Y* then it *must* be the case that *Y* does not stand in the same relation to *X* and that *X* does not stand in the same relation with itself. See: MacBride, 1. Having acquired a way to think about relations, we are set to make our penultimate consideration and then our final consideration.

<sup>15</sup> We have stated earlier that no bowl of yoghurt is also, simultaneously, a bowl of milk (and vice versa). My insistence that we are still considering two things is due to the understanding of ‘simultaneously’ as it occurs in the previous dictum. This understanding can be motivated when we reflect on the fact that a bowl of milk is not a bowl of yoghurt *when* it is a bowl of milk (and vice versa), which can be shown in Case C. When a given bowl contains milk, then that bowl is sufficiently a bowl of milk, and that bowl is necessarily not a bowl of yoghurt. After being completely emptied, when that bowl is filled with yoghurt, then the same bowl is sufficiently a bowl of yoghurt, and that bowl is necessarily not a bowl of yoghurt. Therefore, Case C leads to a consideration of two things, albeit the pair of things considered in Case C differs from the pair of things considered in Case B.

<sup>16</sup> The colloidal mixtures under consideration are whole milk, which is an emulsion-type mixture, and curd/yoghurt, which is a gel-type mixture. See Rows 02 and 04, from the table ‘Types of Colloidal System in Food’ in Rajak, Himanshu (2023) ‘Application of colloid systems in food preparation’, *2nd Sem Food Science Notes*.

spatially identical but physically distinct.<sup>17</sup> Our final case can be stated by modifying Case C as follows:

Case D: Consider that a bowl of milk was left, *undisturbed*, for some time. We left behind a bowl of milk only to return to the *same* bowl now containing yoghurt.

Have we now considered one thing or two things? I argue that we are still considering *two* things: a bowl of milk and a bowl of yoghurt. The pair considered in Case D is similar, but not identical, to the pair considered in Case C. They are similar because akin to Case C, Case D features *one* spatially and physically self-identical bowl, which contained one type of colloidal mixture for some time, and then contained another type of colloidal mixture after that time, such that the two colloidal mixtures occupy the same space—inside one and the same bowl—at different times. The primary dissimilarity between them is that in Case C, there was a characteristic *emptying of* and *refilling of* the bowl, neither of which occurs in Case D, given that the bowl is *left undisturbed*.<sup>18</sup>

In Case D, one could ask that given the bowl is neither emptied nor refilled, how does one leave behind a bowl of milk for some time, only to return to a bowl of

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<sup>17</sup> To illustrate the difference between Case B and Case C, note the following example and compare it with the example that occurs in footnote 14: For the pair of things considered in Case B, all four of the following relations can hold together: (i) X is placed to the left of Y, (ii) Y is placed to the left of X, (iii) X was filled before Y and (iv) Y was filled after X. For the pair of things considered in Case C, the two spatial relations (namely (i) and (ii)) cannot hold, while the two temporal relations (namely (iii) and (iv)) can hold. The spatial relations cannot hold in Case C because for a given thing to be placed left of or right of another thing – both of these things (i.e. *relata*) need to be spatially available simultaneously. Which is to say, that both of them need to be spatially available *when* it is being evaluated whether a spatial relation (i.e. being left of, being right of) can hold between them. Given, Case B featured two spatially and physically distinct bowls, when the bowl of milk was spatially available, the bowl of yoghurt was spatially available as well, and when the bowl of yoghurt was spatially available, the bowl of milk was spatially available. However, the pair from Case C, consisting again of a bowl of milk and a bowl of yoghurt, feature the same (singular) bowl corresponding to both things. In this case, when the bowl of milk is spatially available, the bowl of yoghurt is spatially unavailable and when the bowl of yoghurt is spatially available the bowl of milk is spatially unavailable. Such simultaneous spatial availability is not required for (our) evaluation of temporal relations in Case C. Prior to *it* being a bowl of yoghurt, the *same* bowl was an empty bowl. Prior to being *that* empty bowl, the *same* bowl was a bowl of milk. If so, then based on said two inferences – we can safely infer that prior to *it* being a bowl of milk, *that* bowl was an empty bowl. Therefore, it must have been the case that the bowl of milk was filled before the bowl of yoghurt was filled. As for Case C, regarding asymmetric relations, it can be further inferred that the bowl of yoghurt was filled after the bowl of milk was filled. These distinctions are what lend to the explicit statement of the difference between Case B and Case C.

<sup>18</sup> Reviewing our examples of relations and what does it mean for them to hold (or not) from footnotes 14 and 17, following can be illustrated about Case D, highlighting its dissimilarity with Case C: Our two spatial relations (i.e. being left of, being right of) continue to not hold between the two things considered in Case D. However, this is where the similarity between the two things considered in Case C and those considered in Case D ends. This is so because, unlike the pair in Case C, *even* our two temporal relations (i.e. being filled before, being filled after) do not hold between the pair in Case D.



yoghurt? In answering this question, both the Naiyāyika-*asatkāryavādin* and the Sāṃkhya-*satkāryavādin* would endorse causation as an explanation of Case D.

## § 2.2 Enter the *Asatkāryavādin* and the *Satkāryavādin*

Both the Naiyāyika and the Sāṃkhya would identify the causal relation to be asymmetric<sup>19</sup> because they hold that yoghurt comes from milk and not vice versa. Therefore, upon returning to the bowl containing yoghurt, one may ascertain, veridically, that the milk in the bowl went sour and turned into yoghurt that remains in the bowl and is perceived upon returning. Our *asatkāryavādin*, Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, and his *satkāryavādin*, the unidentified Sāṃkhya, will concede that this is the case.<sup>20</sup> In doing so, they share our position (in Case D) that we are considering

<sup>19</sup> The kind of asymmetry I have in mind here is Herbert E. Simon's strengthening of Arthur W. Burks' notion of asymmetry. The latter originally occurs implicitly in Burks, Arthur Walter (1951) 'The Logic of Causal Propositions', *Mind* 60, 375, P<sub>25</sub>. Simon stipulates it thus [sic]: "We shall require that the causal relation be an asymmetrical one — that "A causes B" be incompatible with "B causes A." Our requirement will be even somewhat stronger. We shall define the relation that "A causes B" is incompatible with "not-B causes not-A." The reason for the requirement is, again, that we wish to keep as close as possible to ordinary usage. Ordinary usage does not sanction: "If the rain causes Jones to wear his raincoat, then Jones' not wearing his raincoat causes it not to rain." " Simon, Herbert Alexander (1952) 'On the Definition of the Causal Relation', *The Journal of Philosophy* 49(16), 517–18. On the aforementioned strengthening, Simon says: "This is one fundamental departure of the present proposal from that of Professor Burks, whose causal relation is asymmetrical, but only in the sense that the implication relation is asymmetrical. Thus, in his system, from "A causes B" it follows that "not-B causes not-A"." Simon, 517, footnote 3.

<sup>20</sup> I emphasise 'our' and 'his' and I employ the usage of the definite article 'the' in the title of §2.2 to indicate that among the plurality of figures holding these two philosophical positions exclusively Uddyotakara and his reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya position will be relevant to us. As for said plurality, among various philosophical positions that purport or assume the veridicality of the Case 4 featuring, *sat-kārya-vāda* [Existent-Effect-ism] and *a-sat-kārya-vāda* [Non-Existent-Effect-ism] are relevant to us. Among the sub-discourses within *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*, only the discourses on *pariṇāma-vāda* [(Effect as a...) Transformation-ism] and *ārambha-vāda* [(Effect as a...) New-Beginning-ism], respectively, will be relevant to us. Among the various schools of Indian Philosophy that defend *pariṇāma-vāda* and *ārambhavāda*, only Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, respectively, will be relevant to us. Among the various written treatises that show the progression of the debate between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on causation, we will be focusing on the debate occurring in passages 458.5–459.2 of *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* which is one of the works attributed to Uddyotakara. *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* is one of the surviving philosophical commentaries on Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, which in turn is a philosophical commentary on Akṣapāda Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*—the central text of Nyāya School. Later, in §3.3., we shall be looking at philosophical commitments featured in the central text of Sāṃkhya, namely Īśvarakṛṣṇa. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. For a focused introduction to *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*, see Matilal, Bimal Krishna (1975) 'Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School', *Philosophy East and West*, 25(1), 41–48.; Shaw, Jaysankar Lal (2002) 'CAUSALITY: SĀMĀKHYA, BAUDDHA AND NYĀYA', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30(3), 214–23; and Sutradhar, Apu (2018) 'Causation In Indian Philosophy', *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)* 23(9.3), 35–39. For a brief introduction to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, see the relevant sections of Perrett, Roy W. (1998) 'Hindu Ethics: A Philosophical Study' *Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy* 17, University of Hawaii Press. and for a non-brief introduction to Old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya see Potter, Karl Harrington eds. (2011) *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Vol. II): Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika upto Gaṅgeśa*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers; and Potter, Karl Harrington eds. (2012) *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Vol. IV): Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, respectively.



two things here: a bowl of milk and a bowl of yoghurt. Keeping in mind the asymmetry of the causal relation, both parties also contend that the bowl can not cause itself; that is, the bowl is neither a cause for itself nor an effect brought about by itself. Therefore, for the bowl of milk and the bowl of yoghurt to stand in a causal relation with each other, it must be the case that the contents of the bowl stand in a causal relation with each other.

According to Sāṃkhya, that which is in the bowl initially *has the form* of milk, then transforms (*pariṇāma*) and *takes the form* of yoghurt within that bowl. Sāṃkhya calls this *prakṛti*, which they identify to be the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*). Among that which partakes in causation, that which is experienceable is *manifest (vyakta) prakṛti*, and that which is unexperienceable is *unmanifest (avyakta) prakṛti*.<sup>21</sup> Initially, the milk is manifest in the material cause, while yoghurt is unmanifest. Later, yoghurt is manifest, while milk is de-manifest. Thus, the Sāṃkhya argues that the effect (yoghurt) is contained in the cause (milk). Therefore, it cannot be *new*. The Naiyāyika trades the notion of a material cause for an instrumental cause (*samavāyī kāraṇa*), that is, milk, and proposes that whatever is there in the bowl initially *is* milk—which is *destroyed*—leading to the *production* of yoghurt in the bowl. That which is destroyed goes out of existence, while that which is produced begins (*ārambha*) to exist. Therefore, that which is destroyed is no longer perceived, and that which is produced is perceived for the first time. Thus, the Naiyāyika argues that the effect isn't contained in the cause. Therefore, it must be *new*.<sup>22</sup> Let us review their major objections to each other and then review how they may respond to said objections—paving the way for Uddyotakara.

The Sāṃkhya objects to Naiyāyika's position that the destruction of milk followed by the production of yoghurt is procedurally identical to what happened inside the bowl during Case C, from §2.1. The Sāṃkhya would point out that in Case C, the milk in the bowl was *replaced* with yoghurt. Whatever/whoever emptied the bowl of milk could have made it so that the bowl was refilled with sand, hair or anything else.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Sāṃkhya would argue that such replacement is *arbitrary*. When the milk is completely destroyed, there is *nothing* left in the bowl to ensure what is produced in the aftermath of the milk's destruction is yoghurt. Sāṃkhya argues the Naiyāyika cannot account for the uncontroversial pragmatic fact that milk left to sour will always, without exception, under normal conditions and accompanying auxiliary

<sup>21</sup> In [NV 458.5–459.2], both Sāṃkhya and Nyāya use the words 'experienceable' and 'perceivable' interchangeably—and they are alluding to the colloquial understanding of the terms. See Dasti and Phillips, 112. I shall refrain from using 'perceivable' given there is a disagreement between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga regarding the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and cognition (*jñāna*) as captured in Phillips, 33–50 and in Mohanty, Jitendra Nath (2000) 'Chapter Two: Theory of Knowledge (*Pramāṇa*-Theory).' *Classical Indian Philosophy: An Introductory Text*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 12–13. Therefore, I use 'experience' wherever I wish to invoke said colloquial understanding.

<sup>22</sup> Matilal, 41–48; Shaw 214–23; Chakrabarti, Arindam (Unpublished Manuscript) Chapter 2, *The Book of Questions: Analytical Introduction to Indian Philosophies*.

<sup>23</sup> Before the bowl was emptied, the fact that it contained milk posed no restriction, whatsoever, on what can replace the milk in the bowl during its refilling.

causes, curdle and produce yoghurt (instead of non-yoghurt). Therefore, for Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyika's proposal fails as an explanation for Case D and conflates Case D with Case C. Which is to say, under the Nyāya causal view, if the effect has to be something *new* that comes about—as opposed to it being pre-existent in the cause as a potentiality—then it can be arbitrary, hence failing to account for causal regularity.<sup>24</sup>

The Naiyāyika objects to Sāṃkhya's position, claiming that it violates a key assumption that is conventionally (and empirically) taken to be sound—which even we granted during §2.1. The Naiyāyika claims that milk containing yoghurt, in any way, is inherently troublesome because then it would *not* be the case that no bowl of milk is, simultaneously, a bowl of yoghurt, and no bowl of yoghurt is, simultaneously, a bowl of milk. For on the Sāṃkhya position, a bowl of milk, in some way, would also be a bowl of yoghurt and vice versa!<sup>25</sup> They could demonstrate the philosophical consequences of such a violation by showing how a commitment to the Sāṃkhya position jeopardises each of our answers in §2.1 to Q<sub>3</sub> concerning Cases

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<sup>24</sup> Psillos, 131. See footnote 4.

<sup>25</sup> This has two ill consequences for Sāṃkhya, according to Nyāya:

(i) It has not been explicitly stated thus far, but the nature of considerations in Section §2.1 result from a common-sensical understanding of processes like emptying, refilling, causation, etc. and concepts like 'bowl', 'milk', 'yoghurt', 'one/two things', etc. Veridically accounting for pragmatic experience is the core of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's philosophical enterprise and methodology. Pragmatic concerns like using yoghurt (and not milk) for cold condiments and using milk (and not yoghurt) for hot beverages are examples of what the Naiyāyikas identify as successful voluntary day-to-day actions (*parovṛtti*). See: Phillips, 7. For them, any metaphysical position which fails to explain or, worse, obstructs such actions is inherently lacking and philosophically worrisome. Hence, the Naiyāyika would claim the Sāṃkhya position to be metaphysically flawed, given its violation of how we common-sensically distinguish between milk and yoghurt.

(ii) Recall that the paper introduced the Q<sub>1</sub> with "...given two *distinguishable* entities X and Y...". Sāṃkhya view threatens Indiscernability of Identicals because if one entity contains the other, then they cannot be completely discernable from each other. See: Forrest, 2. Perhaps, for Sāṃkhya, they are partially non-distinct (*abheda*) as is pointed out in: Shaw, 215. Additionally, the *satkāryavādin* and the *asatkāryavādin* agree that causation involves change. If the *satkāryavādin* is to commit to the effect being contained in the cause, prior to the effect being brought about, then they must also commit to the cause being contained in the effect, *after* the effect is brought about. See: Matilal 1975. Therefore, if milk contains yoghurt, in some way (qua them being *abheda*), prior to the yoghurt coming about, then yoghurt must contain milk, in the same way (qua them being *abheda*), after the yoghurt comes to be. Therefore, on the Sāṃkhya view, an entity which is both milk and yoghurt *changes* into an entity which is both milk and yoghurt. If the Sāṃkhya agrees to this, then there is virtually no change happening wherein this becomes a case of self-causation—which is a position that both Nyāya and Sāṃkhya are opposed to.

A–D, with a drastic consequence for Case D.<sup>26</sup> Under Sāṃkhya view, in Case D, the answer to “Have we now considered one thing or two things?”, will have to be, “One thing, or two things, or four things”: one thing such that the thing that is both milk and yoghurt in the bowl brings about itself (qua self-causation); *or* two things such that the milk (that contains yoghurt, pre-causation) brings about the yoghurt (that contains milk, post-causation) because the milk is not destroyed post-causation; *or* four things such that the milk which is yoghurt brings about the yoghurt which is also milk. The Naiyāyika would claim that Sāṃkhya’s proposal is too much of a departure from the common experience of things for it to be tenable, such that in attempting to explain Case D, it nullifies the commonsensical assumptions granted during Cases A–C. Which is to say, if the effect is *not new*, then there is no need for it to be brought about, for it is already pre-existent (but, as shown, this pre-existence receives massive pushback from the Naiyāyika).

The Naiyāyika would respond to the Sāṃkhya objection of arbitrary replacement via their theory of absences, specifically *prāgabdhāva*.<sup>27</sup> We shall see the indirect yet significant relevance of the Naiyāyika response in §3.4 and how it affects Uddyotakara’s reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya position. For the illustration here, Sāṃkhya’s response to the Nyāya objection is of primary exegetical relevance to Uddyotakara. Sāṃkhya would defend their original answer to Q<sub>3</sub> in Case D, that is, “Two things,” as opposed to the Naiyāyika charge of “One thing, or two things, or four things,” by alluding to their notion of *manifestation*, for only manifest things are experientiable.<sup>28</sup> Therein, Sāṃkhya claims that our consideration in Case D, as in Cases A–C, has been exclusively of manifest things. The singular thing that is both milk and yoghurt is not experienced. Similarly, the bowl of milk that is also the bowl of yoghurt and vice versa is also not experienced. Only milk is manifest in the bowl, and after some time, yoghurt is manifest—as is experienced. Hence, Sāṃkhya continues to insist that Case D features a consideration of two manifest things.

We shall see what Uddyotakara makes of manifestation in §3.2. Having introduced the relevant positions in the *asatkāryavāda* versus *satkāryavāda* debate, let us first

<sup>26</sup> Our answers occurring in §2.1 to Q<sub>3</sub> under Cases A–C change as follows, if the Sāṃkhya view is granted: (i) During Case A, when we considered a bowl of milk for my long neglected cereal, our initial answer was “one thing”. Under Sāṃkhya view, the answer will be “either one thing or two things”, either one thing—i.e., a bowl containing the thing that is *both* milk and yoghurt—or two things, i.e., a bowl of milk which is *also* a bowl of yoghurt. (ii) During Case B, when we considered a bowl of yoghurt, our answer was “two things”. Under Sāṃkhya view, that answer will be, “Either two things or four things”. Either two bowls containing milk and yoghurt separately or a bowl of milk which is also a bowl of yoghurt and another bowl of yoghurt which is also a bowl of milk. (iii) Since our answer for Case C was the same Case B, with different pairs, under Sāṃkhya view, our answer accordingly changes to “Either two things or four things”. Either the same bowl, first containing the thing that is both milk and yoghurt, and then containing the thing that is both yoghurt and milk; or a bowl of milk which is also a bowl of yoghurt then becomes a bowl of yoghurt which is also a bowl of milk.

<sup>27</sup> Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar (1978) ‘THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF NEGATIVE ENTITIES’, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, October 1978, 6(2), 135.

<sup>28</sup> Sāṃkhya’s position of only that which is manifest being experienceable is exploited by Uddyotakara, as will be illustrated in [3.2.3], in §3.2.

move on to modelling the causal views of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya—and uncover some insights about the philosophical friction between them that has, hopefully, been illustrated within §2.

### § 3. The Logic of Uddyotakara's Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika 458.5–459.2

For both Nyāya and Sāṃkhya, causation involves at least two events.<sup>29</sup> For Nyāya, causation comprises an event featuring the *destruction* of the cause and an event featuring the *production* of the effect. Both events are *in* space (*dik*) and time (*kāla*), which are uncaused.<sup>30</sup> For Sāṃkhya, causation comprises an event featuring the *de-manifestation* of *prakṛti* as the cause qua unmanifest (*avyakta*) *prakṛti* and an event featuring the *manifestation* of *prakṛti* as effect qua manifest (*vyakta*) *prakṛti*. While space and time are not uncaused, there is no internal consensus in Sāṃkhya regarding the nature of spatiotemporality.<sup>31</sup> Notwithstanding Sāṃkhya's reluctance

<sup>29</sup> The quantification marker 'at least' that qualifies the expression 'two events' is of utmost importance to my modelling of the Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's causal views and it is warranted by said models being 'basic', as postulated in §3.1. It is important to note that more complex models are possible which capture a more nuanced understanding of the respective causal views of Nyāya and Sāṃkhya, but for the purposes of illustrating the philosophical disagreement captured in the sub-debate in [NV 458.5–459.2], the basic models suffice. My models are basic because they postulate the aforementioned two events to be successive, as captured by [3.1.N.1–2] and [3.1.S.1–2] in §3.1, wherein the destruction/de-manifestation occurs at  $t_{n-1}$ , while the production/manifestation occurs at  $t_n$ . Given  $n$  and 1 are natural numbers, as will be designated in §3.1, it is trivially true that  $n$  is the successor of  $(n - 1)$ . In complex models, these two events may not be taken to be successive, wherein if production/manifestation occurs at  $t_n$ , then destruction/de-manifestation may occur at  $t_{n-z}$ , such that  $z$  is also a natural number, but  $n \geq z > 1$ . However, my basic models shall remain consistent with such complex models, in so far as, it is the case that  $n > (n - 1)$  and it shall remain the case that  $n > (n - z)$ . Therefore, even if in complex models the two events are not taken to be successive, it still remains the case akin to my basic models, that the event featuring production/manifestation occurs *later than* the one featuring destruction/de-manifestation.

<sup>30</sup> For Nyāya, milk and yoghurt are ontologically (qua constitutionally) distinct from space (*dik*) and time (*kāla*), that are ontological sub-types of *substance* (*dravya*), which in turn, is one of the seven fundamental ontological categories (*padārthas*) of Vaiśeṣika, which is the sister school of Nyāya (hence on most occasions, but not all, 'Nyāya', 'Vaiśeṣika' and 'Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika' can be used interchangeably). See: Sharma, Chandradhar (1962) 'Chapter Eleven: VAISHEṢIKA', *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 165. Space and time qua substances are independently existent (time does not exist in space and viceversa) whereas milk and yoghurt qua spatiotemporal entities require space and time as a part of their metaphysical ground. Therefore, space and time are not caused, space and time are that *within* which causation occurs.

<sup>31</sup> As established, almost encyclopedically, in Kumar, Shiv, (1983) 'SĀMĀKHYA-YOGA CONCEPT OF TIME', *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 64(1/4), 129–35, it is clear that there are radically different views of time prevalent among Sāṃkhya philosophers and Yoga philosophers—Yoga being the sister school to Sāṃkhya (hence on most occasions, but not all, 'Sāṃkhya', 'Yoga' and 'Sāṃkhya-Yoga' can be used interchangeably). Kumar covers a variety of philosophical positions on space and time proposed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Patañjali, Vyāsa, Vācaspari Miśra, Vijñānabhikṣu, Hariharanand Aranya, Gauḍapāda, Aniruddha, Brahmamuni Parivrajaka, and Kṣemendra, and captured in commentaries *Yuktidīpikā*, *Jayamangala*, and *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. He concludes that there is no consensus on the nature of time besides the Sāṃkhya-Yoga's 'fundamental differences' with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. See: Kumar, 135. Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not construe time and space to be substances, unlike Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's time-substance (*kāla*) and space-substance (*dik*) which are uncaused. The only uncaused elements (*tattvas*) within the Sāṃkhya's ontological framework are *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, as we shall encounter in §3.3. It should also be noted that such far-reaching

to commit itself to a succession of moments, that is, duration (*krama*), Sāṃkhya is committed to *moments* (*kṣaṇa*) and, by extension, to spatial aspects of whatever features during moments.<sup>32</sup> Sāṃkhya's commitment should be considered in tandem with both schools' acceptance of an asymmetric causal relation and their commitment that causation is not momentary, such that the above-described two events (for both schools) are not simultaneous. Given such a consideration, I propose that we understand whatever is common between the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya notions of a moment the way McTaggart understood it: as a position within a B-Series.<sup>33</sup> This allows us to parse temporal markers like 'prior to,' 'after,' 'now,' 'simultaneously,' etc., in a way that is agreed upon by both parties. Granting this, we can use a simplified<sup>34</sup> B-Series, which is so only insofar as it designates *earlier than* and *later than* relations between its positions, to model Sāṃkhya's and Nyāya's respective causal views and thereby glean the logical form of Uddyotakara's arguments in [NV 458.5–459.2].

### § 3.1 Modelling Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's Causal Views

For entities/events  $X$  and  $Y$  and time-instances  $\dots, t_{n-1}, t_n, t_{n+1}, \dots$  where  $t_{\lambda \pm \mu = \zeta}$  is such that  $\lambda, \mu$ , and  $\zeta$  are natural numbers and time instances are understood as designating positions within a simplified B-Series, Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's causal views can be modelled as follows. For  $n > 1; 0 \geq m \geq 1$ : if  $X$  causes  $Y$  at  $t_n$ , then  $X$  is experiencable at  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $X$  is no longer experiencable at  $t_{n-1}$  and remains unexperienceable at  $t_n$  and

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disagreement between the two schools regarding space and time is the reason that when attributing any notion of causal regularity to both schools, as I did in footnote 4, following two notions are disqualified: "i.  $c$  is spatiotemporally contiguous to  $e$ ; ii.  $e$  succeeds  $c$  in time;" Psillos, 131.

<sup>32</sup> In Burley, Mikel (2007) *Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience*, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 104–07, Mikel Burley acknowledges the type of inconclusiveness that Shiv Kumar identifies in Kumar, 135, and declares: "Such interpretive manoeuvres seem highly dubious, and ought not to be considered as the final word on the Sāṃkhya position [on space and time]" Burley, 105, with the parenthetical clause added by me. Burley does not offer the final word himself because for him the Sāṃkhya problem of space and time is only instrumental to the problem of how the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti* are related to space and time. Ibid., 106. Notwithstanding, he seems to err towards Vyāsa's position, in *Yogabhāṣya*, which proposes "...an atomic theory of time, according to which time is, in reality, nothing other than a succession of indivisible momentary units (*kṣaṇa*) and it is merely our ordinary view, wherein time is conceived in terms of artificial durations, such as hours and days and nights, that is a mental construction. The moments are genuinely existent, and follow one another in a procession; and it is to such a procession of moments, says Vyasa, that the yogin refers by means of the term 'time'." Ibid., 105. Comparing it with Vijñānabhikṣu's position and *Sāṃkhyasūtra*'s view, Burley concludes [sic]: "... the implicit view therein is that time and space obtain only within empirical reality – the realm of thought and perception – and cannot be ascribed to the unmanifest ground of that reality, comprised of the three *guṇas* in their dormant state." Ibid., 106. I subscribe to Burley's view of Sāṃkhya space and time, throughout this paper, because given our discussion in §1–2, both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya-Yoga would uncontroversially agree that causation features within our empirical reality, given their staunch defense of causal regularity.

<sup>33</sup> This would enable us to understand whatever is common between the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya notions of an event as the content of a position within the B-Series. McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis (1908) 'The Unreality of Time,' *Mind* 17(68), 458.

<sup>34</sup> This is so because beyond causation featuring events that are earlier than and later than each other, Nyāya and Sāṃkhya disagree about the ontological status of time and space. Both schools will further disagree with each other and McTaggart on the notion of *change*. McTaggart, 458–61.

$t_{n+m}$ , while  $Y$  is unexperienceable at  $t_{n-2}$  and  $t_{n-1}$ ,  $Y$  is experienceable at  $t_n$  and remains experienceable at  $t_{n+m}$ . This is explainable as follows:

[3.1.N] According to Nyāya:	[3.1.S] According to Sāṃkhya:
<p><math>X</math> is undestroyed at <math>t_{n-2}</math>.  <math>X</math> is destroyed at <math>t_{n-1}</math>.  <math>X</math> remains destroyed at <math>t_n</math> and <math>t_{n+m}</math>.</p>	<p><math>X</math> is manifest at <math>t_{n-2}</math>.  <math>X</math> is unmanifest at <math>t_{n-1}</math>.  <math>X</math> remains unmanifest at <math>t_n</math> and <math>t_{n+m}</math>.</p>
<p><math>Y</math> is unproduced at <math>t_{n-2}</math> and <math>t_{n-1}</math>.  <math>Y</math> is produced at <math>t_n</math>.  <math>Y</math> remains produced at <math>t_{n+m}</math>.</p>	<p><math>Y</math> is unmanifest at <math>t_{n-2}</math> and <math>t_{n-1}</math>.  <math>Y</math> is manifest at <math>t_n</math>.  <math>Y</math> remains manifest at <math>t_{n+m}</math>.</p>
<p>At a given <math>t</math>, no entity/event can be both destroyed and undestroyed, or both produced or unproduced, or both produced and destroyed.</p>	<p>At a given <math>t</math>, no entity/event can be both manifest and unmanifest.</p>
<p>A new entity/event comes about at <math>t_n</math>.</p>	<p>No new entity/event comes about at <math>t_n</math>.</p>

Having obtained [3.1.N] and [3.1.S] as basic<sup>35</sup> models of the Nyāya and Sāṃkhya causal views, respectively, having stated Nyāya's *asatkāryavādin* position and Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavādin* position as discussed in §1–2 in [3.1.N.4] and [3.1.S.4] respectively, we can move on to extracting Uddyotakara's arguments from [NV 458.5–459.2].

### § 3.2 Enter Uddyotakara: Locating the Contradiction

Uddyotakara inquires about the nature of Sāṃkhya's manifestation.<sup>36</sup> Uddyotakara's Sāṃkhya, which presents Uddyotakara's reconstruction of the Sāṃkhya view, clarifies that it is the *mechanism* of bringing about effects.<sup>37</sup> I formulate Uddyotakara's response as follows:

<sup>35</sup> See footnote 29.

<sup>36</sup> Uddyotakara's inquiry is presented during his commentary on [NS 4.1.49] and [NB 242.16]. Here Vātsyāyana [NB 242.16] poses the the question "Something produced does not exist prior to its production—this is certain. Why?" to Gautama's claim in [NS 4.1.49], "Because production and destruction are observed." Dasti and Phillips, 112.

<sup>37</sup> "Sāṃkhya objector: The chief cause, the material cause, has a purpose embedded in it, the purpose of *manifesting* latent individual effects." Ibid., p.112. Note, such an understanding of manifestation should not be confused with manifestation being the *efficient cause* of all effects.

[§ 3.2.1] *Argument Against Manifestation as a Mechanism*

- P1: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>38</sup>
- P2: If an entity/event is manifest at  $t_n$ , then it is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .
- P3: If an entity/event is brought into existence at  $t_n$ , then it could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $t_{n-1}$ ), and so it is a new entity/event that comes about at  $t_n$ .
- P4:  $E$  is an event/entity that is manifest at  $t_n$ .<sup>39</sup>
- C1:  $E$  is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .<sup>40</sup>
- C2:  $E$  could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $t_{n-1}$ ), and so  $E$  is a new entity/event that comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>41</sup>
- C3: It is the case that a (at least one) new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>42</sup>

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- C4: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$  AND it is the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>43</sup>

This is where Uddyotakara first identifies a contradiction<sup>44</sup>, as Sāṃkhya's commitment to manifestation goes against Sāṃkhya's original *satkāryavadin* answer to  $Q_2$ —the answer that we have elaborated upon in §1–2 and modelled in [3.1.S.4]. The contradiction has the following form: Sāṃkhya is committed to *nothing new* coming about post-causation, yet they are committed to manifestation, due to which *something new* must come about.

In response, Uddyotakara's Sāṃkhya locates the effect to be a property of the material cause, and since the material cause is existent pre-causation, then the effect must be, too.<sup>45</sup> Uddyotakara responds as follows:

[§ 3.2.2] *Argument Against Effect as a Property of the Material Cause*

- P1: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>46</sup>
- P2: Unmanifest  $Y$  is not numerically identical to manifest  $Y$ .<sup>47</sup>
- P3: Nothing can be both manifest and unmanifest at a given time-instance.<sup>48</sup>
- C1: If unmanifest  $Y$  is a property of the material cause prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $t_{n-1}$ ), then manifest  $Y$  cannot be a property of the material cause prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,

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<sup>38</sup> By [3.1.S.4].

<sup>39</sup> Sāṃkhya's position in [NV 458.5–459.2].

<sup>40</sup> From P2 and P4.

<sup>41</sup> From P3 and C1.

<sup>42</sup> By simplifying C2 to extract the right conjunct and then existentially generalising.

<sup>43</sup> From P1 and C3.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>46</sup> By [3.1.S.4].

<sup>47</sup> By Leibniz's Indiscernability of Identicals. Forrest, 1.

<sup>48</sup> By [3.1.S.3].



$t_{n-1}$ ).<sup>49</sup>

- P4: If manifest  $Y$  is not a property of the material cause prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}, t_{n-1}$ ) and manifest  $Y$  comes about at  $t_n$ , then it is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .<sup>50</sup>
- P5: If an entity/event is brought into existence at  $t_n$ , then it could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}, t_{n-1}$ ), and so it is a new entity/event that comes about at  $t_n$ .
- P6: Manifest  $E$  is an event/entity that comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>51</sup>
- C2: Manifest  $E$  is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .<sup>52</sup>
- C3: Manifest  $E$  could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}, t_{n-1}$ ), and so manifest  $E$  is a new entity/event that comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>53</sup>
- C4: It is the case that a (at least one) new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>54</sup>

- C5: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$  AND it is the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>55</sup>

Uddyotakara shows that only an *unmanifested effect* could be understood as a property of the material cause, which is definitionally distinct from *manifested effect*, which is what comes about—therefore, something new still comes about, and the contradiction persists.<sup>56</sup>

In response, Uddyotakara's Sāṃkhya clarifies that it is not unmanifested effects that pre-exist in the material cause. Effects simpliciter, that is, entities/events, are what pre-exist in the material cause, and such pre-existence is the reason for them being unmanifested. Manifestation of such entities/events does not amount to new entities/events coming about but pre-existent entities/events becoming experientiable post-causation.<sup>57</sup> Uddyotakara responds as follows:

**[§ 3.2.3] Argument Against Experience of the Manifested Entity/Event**

- P1: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>58</sup>
- P2: There is no time-instance prior to  $t_n$  (that is,  $t_{n-m}$  where  $n \geq m$ ) that features an event wherein entity  $Y$  is experienceable, as  $Y$  is unmanifest prior to  $t_n$  (at... $t_{n-2}, t_{n-1}$ ).<sup>59</sup>

<sup>49</sup> From P2 and P3.

<sup>50</sup> From C1.

<sup>51</sup> Sāṃkhya's position in [NV 458.5–459.2].

<sup>52</sup> From P4 and P6.

<sup>53</sup> From P5 and C2.

<sup>54</sup> By simplifying C3 to extract the right conjunct and then existentially generalising.

<sup>55</sup> From P1 and C4.

<sup>56</sup> Dasti and Phillips, 112.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p.112.

<sup>58</sup> By [3.1.S.4].

<sup>59</sup> By [3.1.S.2]. Also, see footnote 28.

- P3: If the experience of  $Y$  is an event that comes about at  $t_n$ , when  $Y$  is manifest, then it is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .<sup>60</sup>
- P4: If an entity/event is brought into existence at  $t_n$ , then it could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $t_{n-1}$ ), and so it is a new entity/event that comes about at  $t_n$ .
- P5: The event featuring the experience of the entity  $E$  comes about at  $t_n$  when  $E$  is manifest.<sup>61</sup>
- C1: The event featuring the experience of  $E$  is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .<sup>62</sup>
- C2: The event featuring the experience of  $E$  could not have existed prior to  $t_n$  (at ...  $t_{n-2}$ ,  $t_{n-1}$ ), and so it is a new event that comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>63</sup>
- C3: It is the case that a (at least one) new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>64</sup>

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- C4: It is not the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$  AND it is the case that a new entity/event comes about at  $t_n$ .<sup>65</sup>

In response, Uddyotakara's Sāṃkhya offers three alternative postulations of manifestation, but Uddyotakara refutes each of them along similar lines.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, [NV 458.5–459.2] culminates in Uddyotakara concluding that Sāṃkhya's commitment to the *satkāryavādin* position (qua P1 of [3.2.1], [3.2.2], and [3.2.3]), in tandem with their commitment to manifestation, leads to a contradiction that Sāṃkhya cannot resolve. Due to such irresolvability of Uddyotakara's identified contradiction, he establishes the philosophical merit of the *asatkāryavādin* answers to  $Q_2$  and  $Q_1$ , and concludes that an effect is, indeed, a *new* entity/event that begins (*ārambh*) to exist post-causation, when it is brought about because pre-causation that effect (*kārya*) is non-existent (*a-sat*).<sup>67</sup>

### § 3.3 Enter Sandman: The Contradiction Does Not Follow

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<sup>60</sup> From P2.

<sup>61</sup> Sāṃkhya's position in [NV 458.5–459.2].

<sup>62</sup> From P4 and P6.

<sup>63</sup> From P5 and C1.

<sup>64</sup> By simplifying C2 to extract the right conjunct and then existentially generalising.

<sup>65</sup> From P1 and C3.

<sup>66</sup> The three alternative postulations presented by the Sāṃkhya are as follows: (i) It is a "situation" of the material cause wherein the situation is the effect; (ii) It is "a distinct configuration" of the material cause; (iii) It is the "flourishing of the essential nature" of the material cause. Uddyotakara shows (i) to be a sub-species of the effect-as-a-property postulation of the effect, and that (i) is thus refuted by [3.2.2]. As for (ii), Uddyotakara utilizes a distinction criteria similar to that of P2 in [3.2.2] and argues that (ii) entails a distinct configuration of the material cause that did not exist pre-causation, and therefore said distinctness of the configuration imports a *new* configuration. Finally, he points out that (iii) is redundant, given Sāṃkhya's earlier understanding of manifestation as effect-bringing-about-mechanism and that (iii) is refuted by [3.2.1]. In this way, Uddyotakara concludes the irresolvability of the contradiction first encountered in [NV 458.5–459.2]. Ibid., p.112–13.

<sup>67</sup> As Gautama states in , [NS 4.1.50], i.e. the Nyāyasūtra verse right after [NS 4.1.49], "What is proved, however, by our understanding is the prior non-existence of the effect." Ibid., 113.

I refute P2 in [3.2.1], P4 in [3.2.2], and P3 in [3.2.3]. It should be noted that notwithstanding the antecedent of each of these three conditional premises, they share the same consequent: “It [entity/event] is brought into existence at  $t_n$ .” However, Uddyotakara’s reconstructed Sāṃkhya position involving something coming into or being brought into existence is inherently misguided, given Sāṃkhya’s ontological commitments. This leads to the failure of the said premises, and, thereby, Uddyotakara’s arguments are unsuccessful in establishing the contradictoriness within Sāṃkhya’s position.

Sāṃkhya is ontologically committed to twenty-five<sup>68</sup> metaphysical categories (*tattvas*)—out of which two are co-fundamental categories, namely, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the remaining twenty-three are hierarchically organised sub-categories of *prakṛti*. For Sāṃkhya, everything in the world (and beyond) is compositionally reducible to some or all of these categories and permutations thereof. As for their existential status:

- (i) Per [SK 3], *puruṣa* is uncaused and is causally inefficacious, and [SK 17] establishes that *puruṣa* is existent.<sup>69</sup>
- (ii) Unmanifest-*prakṛti* and manifest-*prakṛti* together form *prakṛti*. Per [SK3], unmanifest-*prakṛti* is uncaused but is causally efficacious. Per [SK 3], while all of manifest-*prakṛti* is caused, it is subdivided into causally efficacious and causally inefficacious categories.<sup>70</sup> As established by [SK 8], unmanifest-*prakṛti* is existent despite being

<sup>68</sup> See the end of footnote 70.

<sup>69</sup>[SK 3]: “*Mulaprakṛti* is uncreated; the seven – ‘the great’ (*mahat*) and the others – are creative and created; the sixteen, meanwhile, are [merely] created; *puruṣa* is neither creative nor created.” Burley, 165. Additionally, Burley states, “SK 3 distinguishes four ontological genera on the basis of whether each is creative or created, or both, or neither.” Burly, 92. I understand ‘uncreated’ and ‘uncreative’ as uncaused and causally inefficacious, respectively. SK 17: *Puruṣa* exists due to: 7 composites [being] for another’s sake, the opposite of the three *guṇas* etc., [the need for] a controller, [the need for] an enjoyer, and the process [being] for the purpose of aloneness.

<sup>70</sup> See footnote 69 for [SK 3]. Unmanifest-*prakṛti* includes *mulaprakṛtipradhāna*. Burley notes that, “Yet there is certainly a sense in which the manifest forms are profoundly and inescapably dependent upon their unmanifest ground, and it is perhaps for this reason – that is, to indicate this relation of dependence or conditionality – that the author of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* uses the terms ‘cause’ (*kāraṇa*) and ‘effect’ (*kārya*) apparently synonymously with ‘unmanifest’ (*avyakta*) and ‘manifest’ (*vyakta*) respectively.” Burley, 94. Additionally, manifest-*prakṛti*, is divided into two sub-classes: “2. The seven principles referred to simply as ‘the great (*mahat*) and others’. From verses that occur later in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* it can be inferred that, in addition to *mahat* (which is also called *buddhi*), the seven principles comprise *ahamkāra* plus the five modes of sensory content (*tanmātras*). These are all both creative and created (*prakṛti-vikṛti*). 3. A group of sixteen principles, comprising *manas*, the five sense-capacities (*buddhīndriyas*), the five action-capacities (*karmendriyas*), and the five elements (*bhūtas*). These are all merely created (*vikāra*), and are not themselves creative.” Burly, 92. *Prakṛti* and *puruṣa* along with the seven principles (from 2) and the sixteen principles (from 3) amount to twenty-five principles (*tattvas*).

unexperienceable.<sup>71</sup> Manifest-*prakṛti*, being either temporal or spatio-temporal, is experienceable and therefore is, trivially, existent. Furthermore, the dissimilarity between unmanifest-*prakṛti* and manifest-*prakṛti* is established in [SK 10], featuring ways in which they are opposites of each other.<sup>72</sup> However, notably, none of these distinguish their existential statuses from each other. Hence, both manifest-*prakṛti* and unmanifest-*prakṛti* are existent.

Given (ii), one may impute a Meinongianism<sup>73</sup> to Sāṃkhya, wherein those entities (for example, square-circles) that are necessarily unexperienceable must be existent. However, this is not the case because, for Sāṃkhya, that which is not uncaused and can never be caused and is causally inefficacious is non-existent (*asadkāraṇāt*)—having no being whatsoever (qua subsistence, abstinence, etc.).<sup>74</sup> Therefore, existent entities, exclusively unmanifest-*prakṛti* and manifest-*prakṛti*, partake in causation. This is to say that X cannot bring about Y unless both X and Y exist. Anything non-existent cannot begin to exist, and anything existent cannot cease to exist. Therefore, I postulate the relevant ontological commitment of Sāṃkhya as follows:

$\Omega_s$ : It is the case that everything that exists, neither came into existence nor can go out of existence.

Given  $\Omega_s$ , Uddyotakara's reconstruction is axiomatically erroneous. For Sāṃkhya, while it is the case that an event/entity can be manifest at  $t_n$  or a manifest event/entity comes to be at  $t_n$ , and one can experience such an entity/event for the first time at  $t_n$ —it is not the case that such an event/entity is brought into existence at  $t_n$ . Therefore, each of P2 in [3.2.1], P4 in [3.2.2], and P3 in [3.2.3] turns out to be a *false* conditional premise featuring a true antecedent but a false consequent. Hence, the conclusions of all three arguments do not follow, and by extension, Uddyotakara's contradiction does not follow.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> [SK 8] states that "The non-apprehension of that [i.e. *prakṛti*] is due to subtlety, not non-existence; it is apprehended by means of its effects." Burley 165. Additionally, indirect evidence for the existence of unmanifest-*prakṛti* occurs in [SK 9] and I share Burley's reading, who shares John Davies' reading here: "As Davies and I read it, SK 9 can, in short, be understood as containing a transcendental argument for the existence of unmanifest *prakṛti*. Beginning from the fact of manifest existence, in the form of the various generic constituents of our everyday experience, we can observe that there is, for us, an irresistible urge to assume that all of this experience must have an unmanifest ground, and hence we are obliged to postulate the existence of that unmanifest ground." Burley, 96–97.

<sup>72</sup> [SK 10]: "The manifest is caused, temporal, spatially limited, active, non-singular, dependent, a cipher, composite, conditioned; the unmanifest is the opposite." Burley, 166. "Put in positive terms, this means that it is: (a) unconditioned; (b) eternal (in the sense of being atemporal, as distinct from being continuously enduring); (c) non-spatial (i.e. without spatial limitations, and hence without location or form); (d) inactive." Burley, 93–94.

<sup>73</sup> Reicher, Maria Elisabeth (2025) *Meinongianism*, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>74</sup> This occurs in an excerpt from John Davies' *Hindu Philosophy: The Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īśwara Kṛishṇa* as quoted in Burley, 96: "*Asadkāraṇāt* (literally from non-existence, non-cause) implies that there is an identity in the terms non-existence and non-cause."

<sup>75</sup> In [3.2.1], due to the falsity of P2, C1 does not follow, due to which C2 does not follow and, by extension, C3 does not follow—thereby making it so that C4 does not follow. Similarly, in [3.2.1], due to the falsity of P4, C2 does not follow, due to which C3 does not follow and, by extension, C4 does

It would not be a complete re-evaluation of Uddyotakara's logical moves, if we were to end our inquiry at a refutation. Therefore, let us see why Uddyotakara reconstructs Sāṃkhya's position in the way he does and identify the grounds for his error.

### § 3.4 Uddyotakara's Equivocation and Nyāya's Ontological Commitments

Uddyotakara seems to understand verb phrases like 'brought about' and 'comes about' as 'brought into existence' and 'comes into existence' and hence reconstructs the Sāṃkhya position to involve something coming into existence when it comes about. I do not register this as an arbitrary misunderstanding. Instead, I take this to be an equivocation on his part, given Nyāya's ontological commitment, the specific way in which it differs from Sāṃkhya's, and how it is presented within the Nyāya causal view.

Nyāya is ontologically committed to negative entities (*abhāvas*).<sup>76</sup> They are classified in two ways, based on (a) type of non-existence and (b) duration, as follows:

- (a.i) *ananyonyābhāva*, the non-existence responsible for the *difference* between two entities.<sup>77</sup>
- (a.ii) *samsargābhāva*, the non-existence responsible for the *absence* of an entity on or in another entity<sup>78</sup>, subdivided into:
  - (a.ii.i) *prāgabhāva*, prior absence, the non-existence that comes to an end but is beginningless.<sup>79</sup>
  - (a.ii.i) *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, posterior absence, the non-existence that has a beginning but never comes to an end.<sup>80</sup>
- (b.i) *atyantābhāva*, everlasting non-existence that neither has a beginning nor an end.<sup>81</sup>
- (b.ii) *sāmayikābhāva*, temporary non-existence that has both a beginning and an end.<sup>82</sup>

Given (a.ii.i), (a.ii.ii), and (b.ii), it is evident that Nyāya has a way of making sense of something coming into existence due to the ending of its non-existence and something ceasing to exist due to the beginning of its non-existence. Given  $\Omega_s$  and the discussion in §3.3, Sāṃkhya can parse (a.i) and (b.i) within their ontological

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not follow—thereby making it so that C5 does not follow. Again, in [3.2.3], due to the falsity of P3, C1 does not follow, due to which C2 does not follow and, by extension, C3 does not follow—thereby making it so that C4 does not follow.

<sup>76</sup> Nyāya inherits this commitment from their sister school, Vaiśeṣika. Sharma, 171–80.

<sup>77</sup> Chakrabarti 1978, 134.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 138.

framework but cannot parse (a.ii.i), (a.ii.ii), and (b.ii). Therefore, I postulate the relevant ontological commitment of Nyāya as follows:

$\Omega_N$ : It is the case that some existent things can go out of existence, and it is the case that some non-existent things can come into existence.

Be that as it may, merely juxtaposing  $\Omega_N$  and  $\Omega_S$  is insufficient to sustain a charge of equivocation against Uddyotakara. To see how  $\Omega_N$  features in Nyāya's causal view that Uddyotakara is committed to, we must harken back to the end of §2.2. Therein, Sāṃkhya charged the Naiyāyika with a failure to account for causal regularity as the latter's causal view amounts to the arbitrary replacement of milk in the bowl with yoghurt. We now have the tools to articulate Nyāya's response. The Naiyāyika stipulates that there is a prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) of yoghurt in milk such that when milk turns into yoghurt, the said beginningless absence of yoghurt in milk comes to an end. Extending the stipulation, there is a posterior absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) of milk in the yoghurt such that when the milk turns into yoghurt, the absence of milk begins in the yoghurt and never comes to an end.

Nyāya points out that it is inconceivable that *after* a particular spatiotemporal token of milk *completely* turns into a particular spatiotemporal token of yoghurt, it can again turn into another spatiotemporal token of yoghurt, which is numerically distinct from the previous token of the yoghurt.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, it must be the case that the existence of the milk-token comes to an end when the non-existence of the yoghurt-token (*prāgabhāva*) comes to an end. Inversely, it must be the case that the non-existence of the milk-token (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) begins when the existence of the yoghurt-token begins. Therefore, milk is *destroyed* and yoghurt is *produced* when milk turns into yoghurt. In this way,  $\Omega_N$  is captured within [3.1.N.1], [3.1.N.2], and [3.1.N.3]. This is radically different from Sāṃkhya, as established in §3.3, wherein exclusively that which is existent can partake in causation because, for Nyāya, both that which is existent and that which is non-existent play a role in causation.

Therefore, whenever Sāṃkhya claims that the effect or the experience of it is brought about by manifestation, Uddyotakara equivocatively understands Sāṃkhya to be claiming that that they are brought into existence, and hence P2 in [3.2.1], P4 in [3.2.2], and P3 in [3.2.3], feature the same false consequent.

#### § 4. Conclusion

Having established that the contradiction identified by Uddyotakara in Sāṃkhya's position does not follow from the arguments presented by him, it is the case that [NV 458.5–459.2] fails as a defense of Nyāya's *asatkāryavādin* answer to  $Q_2$  and  $Q_1$ . Such failure does not amount to a defense of Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavādin* answer to  $Q_2$  and  $Q_1$  because, since this failure results from an equivocation on Uddyotakara's part, [NV 458.5–459.2] would be disqualified as a legitimate sub-debate within the

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<sup>83</sup> Shaw, 213–69.

*asatkāryavāda* versus *sakāryavāda* debate due to Uddyotakara's fallacious understanding of Sāṃkhya's position (*pariṇāmanavāda*).<sup>84</sup> Besides, Uddyotakara's is not the final word on *asatkāryavāda* or *satkāryavāda*.<sup>85</sup>

Therefore, even though Uddyotakara's supposed contradiction does not follow, the fierce philosophical friction, as illustrated in §1–2, between Nyāya's *asatkāryavādin* position and Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavādin* position remains unresolved. It would be uncharitable to altogether discard [NV 458.5–459.2] as a viable site for legitimately observing said friction. That being said, it would be good to recall the Naiyāyika's penultimate objection to Sāṃkhya's position in §2.2, right before Uddyotakara enters into the debate. Specifically, the Naiyāyika took issue with Sāṃkhya's explanation of Case D because Sāṃkhya was committed to a position that was too much of a departure from how we common sensically understand the world—an understanding that we rely upon in our day-to-day activities.<sup>86</sup> Notwithstanding the failure of [NV 458.5–459.2], is there a philosophical commitment that was non-erroneously attributed to Sāṃkhya during our inquiry, which could face a similar backlash from the Naiyāyika?

In light of  $\Omega_N$ , I would say that the Naiyāyika may identify a similar departure from common sensical understanding to Sāṃkhya's commitment to  $\Omega_S$ . Therein, re-emerges the aforementioned philosophical friction, taking the form of a

<sup>84</sup> Nyāya identifies three types of debates: debate for truth, i.e., *vāda*; debate for victory, i.e., *jalpa*; and a destructive debate of contrarians, i.e., *vitandā*. According to Nyāya, a philosophical debate should be a *vāda*. To ensure they demarcate *vāda* from other forms of debate by restricting the kinds of argumentative maneuvers admissible in a *vāda* as compared to a *jalpa* or a *vitandā*. The rules of a *vāda* are such that a participant in a *vāda*, i.e. a *vādin*, is obligated to argue/philosophise in good faith while being charitable to their opponent, a fellow *vādin*. See: Dasti and Phillips, 175–80. The rules of a *vāda* strictly prohibit using clingers, equivocation, and misleading objections to prove, defend, or refute a philosophical position, as they promote bad faith and uncharitability towards one's philosophical opponents. If it can be established that a *vādin* has utilized any of these for their philosophical proof/defense/refutation, said proof/defense/refutation is rendered inadmissible within that *vāda*. See: Ibid., 178–79. Uddyotakara, refuting Sāṃkhya's causal view and proving/defending Nyāya's causal view in [NV 458.5–459.2] as an *asatkārya-vādin* and an *ārambha-vādin*, is bound by these rules. The equivocation committed by him, as established in §3.3–3.4, renders his refutation and proof/defense in [NV 458.5–459.2] inadmissible in a *vāda*. The debate [NV 458.5–459.2] is reduced to a pseudo-*vāda* featuring an erroneous reconstruction of the opponent's position by a supposed *vādin* whose philosophical competence cannot be relied upon, and good faith cannot be established, notwithstanding whether such an equivocation was accidental or intentional on Uddyotakara's part. Nyāya's strictness about these rules is exemplified in their three-fold classification of equivocation (*chala*), featuring Nyāya's epistemological and semantic contentions against it: Equivocation with words; Equivocation over generality; and Equivocation over secondary meaning. See: Ibid., 150–54. Out of these three, I register Uddyotakara to be committing equivocation over generality and equivocation over secondary meaning. *Nyāyasūtra* construes them as follows: [NS 1.2.13]: “Equivocation with generality is rendering an unintended meaning through excessively generalizing a meaning that is possible.” Ibid., 152.; [NS 1.2.14]: “Equivocation over secondary meaning is denial of the real meaning when a description designates something through imaginative use of its property.” Ibid., 153.

<sup>85</sup> Famously Vācaspati Miśra composed *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā*, which is a commentary on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika*, and *Tāttvakaumudī*, which is a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Both these commentative texts extend the disagreement between *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda*. See: Potter 2011, 453–54.

<sup>86</sup> See (i) in footnote 25.



disagreement about ontological commitments. From  $\Omega_N$ , it follows that Nyāya also holds that:

$\Omega_{NS}$ : It is not the case that everything that exists, neither came into existence nor can go out of existence.

Whereas, from  $\Omega_S$ , it follows that Sāṃkhya also holds that:

$\Omega_{SN}$ : It is not the case that some existent things can go out of existence, or it is not the case that some non-existent things can come into existence.

It should be noted that  $\Omega_{NS}$  and  $\Omega_S$  are contradictory, and so are  $\Omega_{SN}$  and  $\Omega_N$ .<sup>87</sup> The nature of such contradictoriness is distinct from that identified by Uddyotakara as it is exclusively inherent to neither Nyāya nor Sāṃkhya. Instead, in my understanding, such contradictoriness emerges due to the mutual incompatibility of Nyāya's and Sāṃkhya's ontological commitments and could serve as fertile grounds for a debate about ontological commitments, that is, a meta-ontological debate.

I pause my inquiry here with a final comment. As for *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda*, we have been relishing a philosophically and exegetically rich inquiry into the nature of effect (*kārya*) and causation. Translating *a-sat-kārya-vāda* as Non-Existent-Effect-ism and *sat-kārya-vāda* as Existent-Effect-ism, perhaps we can relish more by a focused inquiry into what it means to be existent (*sat*) and non-existent (*a-sat*).<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> The propositional logical form of  $\Omega_S$  is  $P$  and that of  $\Omega_{NS}$  is  $\sim P$ . The propositional logical form of  $\Omega_N$  is  $(Q \wedge R)$  and that of  $\Omega_{SN}$  is  $\sim Q \vee \sim R$  which is logically equivalent to  $\sim(Q \wedge R)$  by Negation of Conjunction postulate of De Morgan's Laws.

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