Charlotte Carnes, Australian National University
Abstract. This essay critically examines the limitations of consent as a framework for regulating sexual relationships. Drawing on liberal theory, I posit that consent, as a concept, is historically tethered to property rights, patriarchy, and the criminalization of rape, making it insufficient for addressing the complexities of ethical sexual interactions. I analyse the linguistic and legal uses of consent, particularly in relation to the emerging “enthusiastic consent” model, and highlight how these frameworks fail to fully capture the dynamics of good and ethical sex. While recent efforts have sought to expand consent’s role beyond merely distinguishing sexual violence from sex, its continued dominance in legal discourse not only restricts consent’s potential to define ethical sexual relationships, but also reinforces problematic concepts like “non-consensual sex,” which obscure the distinct harm of rape.
Charlotte Carnes is undertaking honours in philosophy at the Australian National University after completing a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Languages. Her research interests include feminist theory, normative and metaethics, and political philosophy. Her honours thesis examines the normative distortion of personhood and sovereignty in the pregnant mother and her foetus in the context of settler-colonial imaginaries
Aniket Sharma, Ashoka University
Abstract. In this paper, I revisit a segment of the Indian philosophical debate between asatkāryavādins (those who hold that effects are not existent within their causes, pre-causation, and must be produced anew) and satkāryavādins (those who hold that effects are existent within their causes, pre-causation, and cannot be produced anew) featuring Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya in Nyāyasūtra 4.1.49, Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya 242.16, and Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika 458.5–459.2. I analyze the sub-debate—as formulated by the attributed author of Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika, Uddyotakara—wherein Sāṃkhya argues that during causation, pre-existent effects are merely manifested and are not new creations, while Uddyotakara, on Nyāya’s behalf, shows Sāṃkhya’s position to be contradictory, thus establishing Nyāya’s position that the effect is not pre-existent and hence, must be a new creation. I show that the contradiction identified by Uddyotakara is a consequence of an equivocation found in his reconstruction of Sāṃkhya’s satkāryavādin position and does not follow from his arguments in [NV 458.5–459.2]. I further argue that if the equivocation is identified, then this segment of the asatkāryavādin versus satkāryavādin debate that seems to be a sub-debate between Nyāya and Sāṃkhya on the nature of the effect collapses into a fundamental disagreement about ontological commitments, the incompatibility of which serves as possible grounds for a meta-ontological debate.
Aniket Sharma earned his Advanced Major in Philosophy with Concentrations in English and Sanskrit Studies from Ashoka University, India, in May 2024. He has been a Teaching Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Ashoka University, since August 2024. He is interested in Western and non-Western Metaphysics, Epistemology, the Philosophy of Logic , Mathematics, Language, and Formal Semantics with a focus on formal theories of quantification, substitution, and replacement
Luke T. Metzger, North Carolina State University
Abstract. In a modern world stricken by evils of all kinds, can we truly live rightly? Reconciliationists like Marx think that we need to figure out a way to be at home in modernity before developing a legitimate answer to this question. Ethical individualists, on the other hand, say yes to the right living question, reminding us of the power of our own agency. Pessimistic holists will disagree with both parties, invariably pointing to evidence both empirical and theoretical that highlights structural inequalities in modern peoples’ opportunities to basic liberties, civil rights, education, healthcare, offices of authority, and so on. Historically, philosophers have placed Adorno and his No Right Living Thesis in the latter camp. In this paper, however, I defend a constructive account of Adorno’s practical philosophy. I argue that, although Adorno is a negativist and a holist, his normativity actually has significant positive value. Adorno, like all great philosophers, provides hope for the future, and hope for human beings. Like myself, Adorno takes it that moderns can and should ultimately aim to live rightly. In contrast to most recent scholarship, I make my positive case for Adorno in a way that preserves his characteristic emphasis on antinomies, or irresolvable puzzles, in modern social life.
Luke T. Metzger will graduate from North Carolina State University with a BA in philosophy in May 2026. He plans to apply to graduate school in philosophy. His philosophical interests include ethics, history of philosophy, social ontology, and philosophy of emotion
Jacob Ritz, University of Queensland
Abstract. Divergent readings of G. W. F. Hegel’s work have proliferated over recent decades, alternating between the two extremes of deflationary or metaphysical interpretations. This paper seeks to bridge the divide between these incompatible perspectives. On the one hand, deflationary views reduce Hegel’s system to an epistemological methodology that makes no metaphysical claims. On the other hand, metaphysical views claim that Hegel develops an ontology from Kant’s philosophy. Interestingly, an analogous divide exists among scholarship of Kant’s critical idealism which Lucy Allais’ moderate metaphysical interpretation addresses directly. As such, I aim to adapt Allais’ interpretation of Kant to help resolve the anarchy that permeates studies of Hegel. First, I outline the deflationary and metaphysical readings of Kant; the incompleteness of the former and the inconsistency of the latter; and present Allais’ moderate metaphysical interpretation as a synthesis of these views which combines their respective advantages. I then outline an analogous divide among Hegel interpretations to uncover an implicit reading of Kant that dominates Hegel scholarship, leading towards a new typology of Kant-Hegel scholarship. This analysis foregrounds my adaptation of Allais’ approach to Hegel’s case, allowing me to sketch a tentative, moderate metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy.
Jacob is a casual academic in German and mathematics and a recent graduate (2024) from the University of Queensland, where he completed majors in German, French, and pure mathematics. In the final year of his undergraduate studies, he wrote an honours thesis comparing Immanuel Kant’s and Bernard Bolzano’s views of intuition and infinity. His interests centre upon the historical intersection and contemporary significance of epistemology, metaphysics, and mathematics in 19th- and 20th-century German philosophy, as well as 20th- and 21st-century French philosophy